The third part explains the need to resolve this difficulty, and argues that resolving it requires overcoming the appearance of a gulf between self-understanding and understanding from outside. (This is the consequence that Kant spoke of when he said that the "I think" is not “a representation distinguishing a particular object, but rather a form of representation in general”, and Anscombe spoke of when she said that "I" is not a referring expression.) Amongst other things, this consequence seems to put in doubt the very idea of empirical objectivity, for it seems to prevent the subject from understanding himself as perceiving and interacting with (as he would put it) “objects outside of me”. The second part further articulates the conception of self-understanding introduced in the first part,Īnd describes a troubling consequence of this conception-that self-understanding is in an important sense empty, in that it does not distinguish the one who has it from anyone or anything else. It shows how many of the prevailing orthodoxies of this branch of philosophy can be traced to this fact, and how, if thisīranch of philosophy were to seek self-understanding, its landscape would be significantly altered. The first part explains what it is for philosophy to seek self-understanding, and argues that much ofĬontemporary Anglophone philosophy does not seek understanding of this form. I am currently writing a book that explores and develops this idea. For this is an insight that contemporary philosophy has largely lost. It asks: “What am I?” as opposed to “What is it?” Or at least, this is what it used to do. Philosophy seeks self-understanding, or understanding “from within”, as opposed to understanding “from outside”. In the use of “I”, the essence of philosophy is contained. Perhaps the most famous sentence in Western philosophy is “I think, therefore I am”.
At the heart of my work is the idea of the first personal character of philosophy itself.
I am currently working mainly on the idea of self-consciousness, and on how this idea serves to unite my three central concerns. I am especially interested in how these ideas relate to themes in the history of analytic philosophy, and in German Idealism. My work centres on the ideas of action, perception, and objectivity.
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